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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Background 
Globalization is a relevant issue for policymakers and firms alike. Although individ-
uals, firms, and countries have always been connected in various ways throughout history, 
commentators generally claim that globalization has caused a   once-unfathomable new 
height of connectedness at the dawn of the 21st century. This is typically considered to be the 
outcome of the combined effects of regulatory, political, and market liberalization combined 
with technological change, especially in information and communication technologies (ICT). 
In short, globalization might be defined as “the high and increasing interdependency and interre-
latedness among different and geographically dispersed actors” (Archibugi and Iammarino, 2002, 
p. 99; for a popularized discussion see also Friedman (2005)). 
The most visible trend of globalization, from the viewpoint of firms, has been foreign 
direct investment (FDI), in the form of the outsourcing and offshoring of manufacturing. 
However, the rapid change in the global division of manufacturing has perhaps oversha-
dowed another phenomenon: the internationalization of research and development (R&D) 
(UNCTAD, 2005). Globalization of R&D means researchers and inventors increasingly tend 
to be located outside the home country of their companies. Despite this trajectory, Patel and 
Pravit present the non-globalization argument in a seminal paper (Patel and Pavitt 1991), 
suggesting that the actual inventive activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) tend to 
be significantly less globalised than the international distribution of R&D expenditures 
seems to indicate. Patel and Pavitt (1991) suggest that this may be because country-specific 
characteristics of national systems of innovation still matter for more strategic R&D activi-
ties; they highlight such issues as the importance of physical proximity and tacit knowledge, 
education, training, and basic research.  Indeed, R&D internationalization is still today a 
much-debated subject.  Several studies, which will be reviewed in later sections, have recent-
ly documented that a growing share of R&D of MNCs is off shored, but evidence is mixed 
and the “non-globalization” argument also finds support in other empirical analyses.  
My focus on the wireless telecommunications industry is particularly interesting and 
relevant to this debate for three reasons. First, this industry has benefited from trade liberali-
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zation, deregulation, and technological change, as governments around the world are devel-
oping and upgrading their ICT infrastructures (Zysman and Newman, 2006). Second, the in-
dustry has also changed its technological core due to the convergence of data- and telecom-
munications and the emergence of the Internet, thus providing multiple entry points for 
firms and inventors, including new geographical locations outside the US and Europe.  
Third, much of the extant research on the internationalization of R&D tends to treat R&D as 
a `black box´  where the specificities of different types of R&D are undisclosed. This is partly 
a consequence of the lack or inaccessibility of detailed data on the different types of R&D 
and inventive activity at the firm level. Due to the significance of standardization, a system 
of notification of patents deemed essential to specific standards has been set up. This system 
provides an interesting analytical lens for identifying R&D and inventive activities that lie 
closest to the technological core of the industry in a strategic, and perhaps also commercial, 
sense. I will argue that entering into the discussion of patents and Intellectual Property (IP) 
is beneficial to an examination of the internationalization of R&D as it allows a closer look at 
the ways the management of intangibles can influence the exploitation of international R&D 
investment. 
This paper contributes to research providing a new interpretation for the home-
boundedness of critical industrial R&D, and in general to the literature on appropriability 
and maturation of R&D off shoring. I was able to discuss the result of my quantitative em-
pirical analysis directly with the managers involved in key decisions relating to the devel-
opment of some of these technologies. Their viewpoint suggests the presence of what I have 
defined “Safe R&D nests”. I will discuss that such “safeness” derives by a close coordination 
between scientific and technological research and management of intangible assets. 
 
1.2.  Aim and structure 
This paper compares the international distribution of strategic R&D activities related 
to the development of wireless standards to other (non standard related) projects in the tele-
communication industry. While there is evidence that leading companies in this industry are 
globally sourcing their know-how, more strategic R&D projects still remain homebound. 
 4
Conversations with R&D and Intellectual Property (IP) managers at Ericsson, Motorola, No-
kia, and Qualcomm further support this finding. These semi-structured interviews confirm 
the mainstream views that R&D subsidiary maturation and organizational inertia limit the 
decentralization of strategic innovative activities. Managers claim that the level of appro-
priability of R&D is not the same throughout the entire company. Some centers and labs 
have developed better coordination between R&D technicians, lab managers, and IP experts. 
Such coordination was generally higher at the headquarters of these companies where the 
central R&D labs were located. Such domestic centers preserved the desirable setting for a 
high level of exploitation of R&D results, making them unchallenged “Safe Nests” where 
strategic technologies were nurtured and developed.  
The paper is structured in the following manner. In the second section I provide a 
brief conceptual discussion of major interpretations of R&D internationalization and a re-
view of the major themes in the empirical literature. I also consider the specificities of the 
wireless telecommunications industry. In the third section I discuss the data I use and pro-
vide empirical analysis of essential patents notified to ETSI (European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute), and less essential ones. In the fourth section I validate my statistical 
analysis through interviews with managers at the four companies and present the Safe R&D 
Nests interpretation. I will conclude and identify possible avenues for future research in the 
fifth and final section. 
 
2.  THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF R&D 
2.1.  Three drivers of R&D internationalization 
Given the relatively recent nature of a fairly confined but growing phenomenon,1 
much attention has been given to the causes and consequences of R&D internationalization. 
This is particularly true as the competitiveness of firms and the development of regions 
where MNCs are headquartered are at stake. The literature identifies three main drivers for 
the internationalization of R&D.   
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The first driver of R&D internationalization is adaptation to foreign demand.  As 
MNCs expand their export activities for new or existing markets they need to invest more 
resources into understanding the nuances of foreign markets in order to adapt their prod-
ucts to the different needs  of these clienteles.  R&D efforts in this case offer the logistical 
support to leverage overseas knowledge generated in the central, and generally domestic, 
R&D lab.  The knowledge flows of such investment are therefore one-way only, from the 
center to the periphery (Dunning, 1958, Hymer, 1976).  Scientists and technicians remain 
homebound and the result of critical R&D activities is combined with know-how of a local 
market for the local exploitation of a globally homogeneous production. Scholars call this 
type of investment “adaptive R&D” since it is driven by the desire of MNCs to enter new 
markets and exploit home-based advantage through foreign activities (Kuemmerle, 1997).     
Investing in a firm’s “absorptive capacity” is a critical juncture for a second driver of 
R&D internationalization (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). An R&D presence overseas might be 
necessary given (1) raising levels of technological integration and specialization, (2) the need 
to gain access to and exploit pockets of knowledge located in various countries, as well as (3) 
the need to integrate “peripheral” forms of knowledge with core technologies. Today, com-
panies do not go abroad merely to exploit home-based knowledge for foreign markets, but 
also to learn and explore foreign knowledge located in deep pockets overseas (see here: Ge-
rybadze and Reger, 1999; Dunning, 1994; Kuemmerle 1997, 1999). As understanding of this 
type of `home-based augmenting´ R&D is gaining ground, scholars argue that the characte-
ristics of individual firms are relevant to understand their specific location strategies (Alcac-
er and Chung, 2007). 
The third driver of internationalization is the access to and use of cheaper factors of 
production for the more time-intensive phases of an R&D project.  This form of internationa-
lization shares characteristics similar to the modularization and decentralization of manufac-
turing activities. Such a phenomenon is heavily discussed in the organizational literature.2 
Modularization of an R&D project (Brusoni et al., 2001) theoretically renders possible a dis-
tribution of labor within a company and the delocalization of time intensive R&D phases to 
peripheral laboratories localized in areas with access to a cheap and qualified labor pool. 3   
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2.2.  Maturation of foreign R&D investment 
Adapting to local foreign demand, tapping into deep and distant knowledge pockets, 
and achieving cost reduction by offshoring advanced service functions lead to a rethinking 
of the entire R&D workflow and, in particular, a reorganization of strategic planning, sup-
port functions, and time intensive phases of development projects.  This process does not 
happen overnight and there is a vast amount of literature focused on the trial and error 
process that guides MNCs through the reorganization of their international technological ac-
tivities. While it is not possible here to review the large and growing literature, it is worth 
pointing out three aspects that guide empirical and theoretical discussion: maturation, auth-
nomy, and coordination.4   
Maturation suggests that as foreign R&D sites increase their local know-how, they are 
assigned different tasks and responsibilities by the headquarters (Birkinshaw (1996) and Bir-
kinshaw and Hood (1998), Gerybadze and Reger (1999), von Zedwitz and Gassmann (2002), 
Mendez (2003), Mudambi and Navarra (2004)).5 The level of autonomy from the headquarters 
sets the conditions for a trade-off between central coordination and local “embeddedness”, 
and exploitation of foreign knowledge pockets (Zander (1997 and 2002), Gerybadze and 
Reger (1999),  Rugman and Verbeke (2001), Frost (2001), Mudambi and Navarra (2004)). 
Coordination between local “centers of excellence” and the headquarters is one of the dimen-
sions of organizational models for an MNC with distributed R&D investment (Birkinshaw 
and Morrison (1995), Birkinshaw (1996), Asakawa (2001), Frost et al.  (2002)).  
2.3.  Evidence of non globalization: Patel and Pavitt (1991) revised 
The seminal paper by Patel and Pavitt (1991) is possibly the first comprehensive em-
pirical effort to determine the extent of internationalization of R&D using patent data. In a 
series of empirical papers using the affiliation of inventors of patents to identify the location 
of inventive activity they show the overwhelming importance of home-based innovative activ-
ity for the main MNCs in the period from 1969 to 1986. The conclusions of that exercise were 
surprising as they clearly highlighted the importance of a `non-globalization´ of the innova-
tive activities of these MNCs. In particular, Patel and Pavitt (1991) suggest that in most cases 
these companies “have a long way to go before their technology activities become anywhere nearly 
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as globalized”. The two scholars present only tentative explanations for the need of physical 
proximity. Possible explanations, as specified by Patel and Pravitt, relate to market uncer-
tainties and characteristics of the local innovation systems, such as proximity to relevant and 
tacit sources of knowledge, or to facilities that incorporate and integrate multidisciplinary 
knowledge. 
In 1996, a special issue of the IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management opens 
with a section dedicated to the observation that “R&D is going global”6, and the internatio-
nalization of R&D is the topic of debate of both managers and policy makers.7 Patel and Pa-
vitt (1991)’s claim that “we expect to see greater internationalization of large firms’ technological 
activities in the future” is echoed throughout the 1990s in subsequent studies.  While this pa-
per will not review the literature, such analysis provides ambiguous support to the claim 
that R&D performed at a foreign location is proving to be increasingly important for the de-
velopment of core technologies. A large body of literature points to the resilience of the non-
globalization argument8 and finds little to no new evidence of globalization. Yet other scho-
lars9 point to different sources and suggest that indeed a growing decentralization of R&D is 
taking place. While there is no doubt that companies assign their foreign subsidiaries devel-
opment responsibilities to adapt production to the local needs, still Kuemmerle (1999)’s ar-
gument about the coexistence of both “adaptive” and “augmentive” R&D activities is vali-
dated by subsequent empirical analysis.  Home-based knowledge exploitation and augmen-
tation do coexist and no clear trend can be isolated and generalized. My study contributes to 
this debate and differentiates R&D projects according to the strategic relevance of their re-
sults.  
2.4.  The wireless industry and the importance of standards 
A priori, there seems to be little evidence to support the case for ‘non globalization’ of 
R&D and inventive activity in the wireless telecommunications industry.   
During the 1980s and the 1990s, trade and regulatory liberalization of national tele-
communications markets globalized the demand for telecommunications equipment, more-
over technological change in the industry has had pervasive effects on R&D further up-
stream.  One aspect of this is the ongoing convergence or fusion between various technology 
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subfields of ICT (Information and Communication Technologies). This fusion opens up mul-
tiple entry-points for new firms and other players. 
The term ICT convergence is commonly used to indicate the merging of data and tel-
ecommunications technologies, which were characterized as two separate fields until the 
1980s.  As a consequence, a range of new products, services, applications, markets, policy 
and regulatory domains are also merging (Bohlin et al., 2000).  Above all, the Internet has 
had many important implications for telecommunications incumbents.  The increasing pop-
ularity of the Internet means that mobile telecommunications applications and services must 
also become compatible with the  TCP/IP-standards.  This is also evident in a range of stan-
dardization efforts around the fringes of the core next generation standards (such as the 3G 
standard UMTS in Europe), examples of which include the WAP forum, GPRS and EDGE 
standards.  (Kogut, 2004).   
Standards define the interfaces of technologies that firms in the industry have to 
comply with in order to create new markets.  Standards are typically created through differ-
ent types of consortia, “clubs” or industry groups consisting of carriers, manufacturing 
firms, standardization bodies, and other stakeholders (Leiponen, 2005).  As a result, stan-
dardization bodies have set-up various methods to support the notification and cross licens-
ing of the intellectual property rights (IPRs) over such technologies. This to ensure that no 
single firm or other stakeholder be able to block the standardization process itself.  On the 
other hand, the existence of multiple and potentially overlapping technologies and IPRs acts 
as an incentive for firms to strive to manage their IPRs with respect to these various notifica-
tion schemes (Bekkers, 2001; Bekkers and West, 2006). 
2.5.   “Essential IP” and the system of patents notification  
The standardization schemes delimit a subset of technologies and IPRs that are at the 
core of the industry in a strategic long-term sense, but that also have a relatively higher 
technological and economic value.  The European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI) defines a patent to be essential when “it is not possible on technical (but not commer-
cial) grounds, taking into account normal technical practice and the state of art generally 
available at the time of standardisation, to make, sell lease, otherwise dispose of, repair, use, 
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or operate equipment or methods which comply with a standard without infringing that [in-
tellectual property]” (ETSI, 1998).  Early disclosure and licensing agreements of “essential 
patents” are important ingredients for the smooth application of the work of the technical 
committee. Disclosure and licensing should eliminate roadblocks to technological develop-
ment that might jeopardize the efforts of standardization partners.  By avoiding a deadlock 
and pursuing development and adoption of a particular standard everybody will benefit, 
especially companies that have successfully lobbied for inclusion of their IPR in the stan-
dard.   
In the case of the European standardization body ETSI, Bekkers (2001) suggests that 
IPR holders indeed do have strong incentives to notify their patents as essential,10 as this is 
the first necessary step to lobby for single patents in the technical specifications coming out 
of the standardization working group.  The inclusion of essential patents in an ETSI technic-
al specification opens up various strategy avenues for the company, as well as significant li-
censing revenue opportunities, even under the fair and non-discriminatory agreement.  The 
complexities of patent searches and the uncertainties related to the technological develop-
ments of the standard might suggest that ETSI members are more likely to notify and lobby 
for inclusion of IPRs that they are extremely familiar with and which they are convinced can 
be enforced and controlled further downstream in product development projects.  During 
pre-standardization, each assignee will have to lobby and convince partners that a license to 
its IPRs is the most efficient way to solve a technological need, while designing around these 
might either be impossible or only a second-best solution.  During this complex negotiation 
phase, it is not only the successful market adoption of a standard that is on the line but also 
the reputation of the IPR assignee.  Thus, it seems safe to assume that these IPRs protect 
proprietary technologies that influence the trend of their technological activities and strateg-
ic choices in terms of commercialization.  Framed in this way, it is therefore interesting to 
ask: to what extent are the R&D activities that lead to essential IPR homebound?  
Apart from the strategic importance of essential patents, there is a debate about 
whether or not such patents might also be more significant in terms of their technological 
and economic value.  A paper by Rysman and Simcoe (2006), which analyzes the notifica-
tions schemes of four major international standard setting bodies, finds that notified IPRs 
(patents) have a higher technological, and potentially also economic, significance than non-
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notified ones.  The paper by Rysman and Simcoe (2006) also suggests that the data used here 
captures technologically and economically “more significant R&D” of the firms included.   
 
3.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
3.1.  Methodology. Description of the data and the qualitative study  
In this section I move on to the empirical analysis with the purpose of exploring to 
what degree, and how, the technological core of the wireless telecommunications industry is 
globalizing, and the degree to which the case for non-globalization might still have some re-
levance in the context of Patel and Pavitt (1991).  In order to do so, the analysis presented in 
this paper rests on the comparative analysis of inventive location activity validated through 
in-person interviews with the VP for R&D and standards at the most representative compa-
nies in the industry.  The comparison is here performed using patent data for the develop-
ment of telecommunications standards, with a control group of similar, but ultimately less 
strategic patents. 
With reference to the earlier discussion, the European Telecommunications Stan-
dards Institute (ETSI) represents an important standard-setting body in the European con-
text and thus functions as a natural point of departure for data gathering.  ETSI has set up a 
notification scheme where both members and non-members are requested to provide a writ-
ten statement if their technologies and IPRs (patents) can be deemed essential to the devel-
opment and inauguration of particular standards (see http://www.etsi.org/).   
This empirical analysis uses patent data originally identified in the ETSI database on 
essential patents.  These data can be accessed through online documentation containing lists 
of “essential patents” under various standards commissioned by ETSI.  In particular, this 
paper considers the four largest assignees of essential ETSI patents: Ericsson, Motorola, No-
kia, and Qualcomm. I take into account patents filed at the patent office in the U.S. (USPTO) 
during the period 1985 - 2001, and subsequently published before May 2006.  Information 
about technology classes, date of filing and publication, affiliation of inventors, scope of in-
ternational protection, keywords, backward and forward citations are also gathered.  Given 
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the arguments presented in the previous section, it seems safe to assume that the disclosed 
essential ETSI patents provide complete coverage over the enabling technologies discussed 
by the standardization committee, and that in particular, standardization partners are not 
concealing, or failing to disclose, essential patents. 
 
TABLE 1:  Patents Notified as Essential at ETSI by Companies 
 Company Patents Company Patents Company Patents
Ericsson 241 Digital Theater Systems 6 Marconi Communications 2
Qualcomm Inc. 143 Nexus Telocation Systems 6 3COM Corporation 1
Motorola 91 Samsung 6 Ensemble 1
Nokia Corporation 78 British Telecom 5 Entrust Ltd. 1
InterDigital Technology 66 Digital Voice Systems 5 France Telecom 1
Philips Electronics 29 Mitsubishi Electric 5 Innovatron 1
Hughes Network Systems 27 Sun Microsystems 5 Intel 1
SIEMENS 19 KPN 3 IPR Licensing 1
Alcatel 18 NEC Corporation 3 Microsoft Corp. 1
AirTouch Communications 15 NTT 3 Tantivy Communications 1
TOSHIBA Corp 14 OKI Electric Industry 3 Vimatix 1
Nortel Networks Ltd. 11 Ascom Management 2 Wi-Lan 1
Lockheed Martin 7 ETRI 2
AT&T 6 Inmarsat Ltd. 2 Total 834
 
Source: ETSI, data updated to April 2005.  
 
In order to assess the case for non-globalization in the context of strategically impor-
tant patents at the technological core of this industry, a control group of non-notified patents 
is defined according to the following steps: 11 
1. In order to define this set of patents, all the technology classes assigned to the essential 
patents are considered. 
2.  The complete portfolio of non-notified patents belonging to the same technology classes 
assigned during the same period to the same four companies and their subsidiaries is 
gathered. 12 
3. Within this portfolio, a total of 4,358 patent families, only non-notified patents that share 
technological keyword and backward patent citations with essential patents are 
considered. 13  
4. Among this subgroup of 3,501 patent families, through propensity score matching, I 
define a sample of 1,420 non-notified patent families that present strong similarities with 
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essential patents in terms of both type of patent literature cited and the technological 
keywords used in the abstract.14 
With reference to the discussion above, this control group of patents can be consi-
dered less strategic, on average, from the point of view of the activities of these firms in Eu-
ropean and global markets.  This assumption requires some clarification.   
Patents are not commodities, and their value distribution is often skewed as a large 
majority of patents assigned to companies have little to no intrinsic economic significance.  
The notification with ETSI makes a patent strategically relevant for the company, given that 
Through their notification, the usefulness and commercial value of such assets is somehow 
certified. By definition, control group patents have not been notified as essential to ETSI. 
This does not, however, exclude the possibility that at least some of the patents of them are 
extremely important for the company.15  The main assumption here is merely that the stra-
tegic relevance of patents in the control group is, at the very least, more heterogeneous.     
Furthermore, a comparison of inventive activities of U.S. and non-U.S. companies 
based on patents filed and issued by the U.S. patent office (USPTO) is biased; American 
companies use the USPTO as the first and main source of protection for their IP, while for-
eign companies might decide to file a patent in the U.S. only for a subset of their patents.  
The core of this analysis encompasses a comparison of patenting behavior of U.S. and Euro-
pean companies.  It is necessary, therefore, to adopt a correction to this bias: all USPTO pa-
tents assigned to the two U.S. companies are excluded from the analysis when, within each 
patent family, there is no equivalent patent or application filed with at least one European 
patent office.16   
In the ETSI database, 1113 USPTO patent notifications were counted.  Since each pa-
tent can be notified for more than one standard commissioned by ETSI, ultimately the data-
base contains 834 unique granted USPTO patents (see Table 1).17  64.4%, or 537, of these pa-
tents are assigned to the four largest assignees.  As this analysis is a comparison of the in-
ventive activities of MNCs, choosing these four companies was quite natural.  Ericsson, No-
kia, Motorola and Qualcomm are the largest assignees of ETSI essential patents.  They are al-
so the four most significant players in the wireless telecommunications industry in Europe 
and the U.S.18   
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Findings presented in the previous paragraphs require a more detailed discussion 
and a better understanding of the causes of the relative “homeboundedness” for essential 
inventive activities.  The approach chosen to cater to this need was to present these research 
findings to top managers at the companies included in this study.  During  August and Sep-
tember 2006, interviews were conducted with VP for research, standardization, and IP man-
agement at the companies considered for this study.19  Semi-structured discussions began by 
presenting the results of the inventive location analysis.  Subsequently managers were pre-
sented with a set of open questions regarding the methodology, findings, relative position-
ing of competitors, and perspective on the industry.    
 
3.2.  Invention location analysis 
Information about the affiliation of inventors on the patent title is here used as a 
proxy for the location where the inventive activity leading to the filing of the patent was per-
formed.  The analysis, which resembles the approach followed in Patel and Pavitt (1991), as-
signs patents to these two exclusive categories. 
1. HomeBased Patents (HB): patents whose inventors are all located in the HQ country (or 
U.S. state) of the controlling company: the U.S. for Motorola and Qualcomm (or Illinois 
and California respectively), Sweden for Ericsson, and Finland for Nokia. 
2. Remote Patents (RE): patents which have at least one inventor located in countries (or 
U.S. states) other than the HQ country (or U.S. state) of the controlling company.20   
  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of patents into the two categories. The share of HB 
essential patents is 72.25% compared to 52.89% for control group patents. Essential patents 
appear to be significantly more homebound than control group patents. When data is 
weighted using 2 years forward citations, results are similar, confirming that also forward 




FIGURE 1:  Distribution of Patents by Location of Inventive Activities (HB de-
fined as California, Illinois, Sweden and Finland) 
  




TABLE 2:  Distribution of Essential and Control Groups HB/RE Patents Across 
Companies.  
Company Essential Patents Control Group 
All 4 Companies   
HB 388 (72.2%) 751 (52.9%) 
RE 149 (27.8%) 669 (47.1%) 
Total  537 (100%) 1420 (100%) 
 Pearson chi2(1) =  60.0694   Pr = 0.000 
Ericsson    
HB 152 (63.0%) 219 (38.9%) 
RE 89 (36.9%) 343 (61.0%) 
Total  241 (100%) 562 (100%) 
 Pearson chi2(1) =  39.4219   Pr = 0.000 
Nokia   
HB 62 (86.1%) 208 (72.0%) 
RE 10 (13.9%) 81 (28.0%) 
Total  72 (100%) 289 (100%) 
 Pearson chi2(1) =   6.1116   Pr = 0.013 
Motorola 85 385 
HB 58 (68.2%) 185 (48.0%) 
RE 27 (31.8%) 200 (52.0%) 
Total  85 (100%) 385 (100%) 
 Pearson chi2(1) =  11.3588   Pr = 0.001 
Qualcomm   
HB 116 (83.4%) 139 (75.5%) 
RE 23 (16.6%) 45 (24.5%) 
Total  139 (100%) 184 (100%) 
 Pearson chi2(1) =   2.9807   Pr = 0.084 
   
Source: elaboration from Delphion. Patents assigned between 1985 to 2005.  
 
Table 2 represents the distribution of HB and RE essential and control group patents 
across the four companies in the sample. At the company level, the Pearson Chi-Square val-
ues reported in Table 2 confirm that it is possible to reject for all companies but Qualcomm 
(with 0.01% significance level) the null hypotheses that the distributions of HB and RE pa-
tents are similar. For three of the four largest assignees of ETSI patents I can say that inven-
tive activities leading to essential patents was relatively more homebound. Motorola result 
holds only when I consider the state level (Illinois). The Pearson Chi-Square value for home-
boundedness at the country level for Motorola does not allow me to reject the null hypothe-
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sis of a difference in international distribution for essential and control group patents.22 The 
case of Qualcomm is less significant for this study since most of its R&D investment during 
the period of observation was bound to the San Diego area, and the company had no signifi-
cant R&D activities outside California. 23 
The changing distribution of patents over time shows that these four companies sub-
stantially increased the number of RE patents in the course of the late 1990s, however such a 
trend is less pronounced for essential patents, whose HB share remains more or less con-
stant. Somewhat of a reverse trend can be detected for the last two years under considera-
tion. 2000 marked the beginning of a sharp decline in the number of patents, and this decline 






Table 3 considers exclusively the foreign locations of RE patents (defined at the coun-
try level).  HB patents are excluded from this computation since, by definition, all the inven-
tors of these patents are located either in the U.S. or in Europe.   
 
TABLE 3:  Distribution of offshore locations for RE patents 






U.S. (for Ericsson and Nokia) 52.0% 38.7% 
E.U. (for Motorola and Qualcomm) 25.7% 45.2% 
Canada 15.4% 6.5% 
Japan 2.6% 6.5% 
S.E.A. 0.7% 0.0% 
R.O.W. 3.6% 3.2% 
Total RE Patents 455 140 
 
The first interesting aspect in the data is the dominant position of the United States 
as an affiliation of offshore inventors, both for essential and control group patents.  52% of 
offshore inventive activities of control group patents  are performed in the U.S., while 38.7% 
of the patents indicated as essential show a U.S. inventor.  European countries are the lead-
ing placing of foreign inventive activities for essential patents and the second for control 
group. Canada is also another important affiliation of inventors, and the share of Canada is 
higher than Japan, Asia (SEA) and the Rest of the World (ROW).  Somewhat surprisingly, 
this latter group of countries/regions altogether represents less than 4%of all offshore pa-
tents.  Hence, such emerging countries and regions are substantially absent as affiliations of 
inventions for ETSI standards and non-essential wireless technologies according to this 
analysis.  Since not many inventive locations are located outside North America and Europe, 
and since this research looks at European and American companies only, it is possible to say 
that what the data describes is mostly a flow of R&D related investment from the U.S. to Eu-
rope and from Europe to the U.S.  
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Unfortunately the data lags behind and cannot reach definite conclusions about the 
R&D and inventive activities performed in the last three or four years, during which time 
these countries have been identified in the popular press as the largest recipients of foreign 
R&D investment.  Nonetheless, these observations appear in line with the findings of the 
UNCTAD 2005 report, which describes a distribution of R&D investment still highly skewed 
toward these “old and incumbent” centers of innovation. 
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3.3.  Multivariate Analysis 
The scope of my multivariate analysis is to test whether, after controlling for various 
characteristics of individual patent titles, those that have been deemed essential through ET-
SI are relatively more homebound than control group patents. Through logistic regression I 
therefore test the hypothesis that the odd ratio to have all inventors located in the HB coun-
try/state for patents is higher than one when patents are essential.  
Model (a), summarized in Table 4, reports the odds ratio resulting from a logisitic re-
gression coefficient where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the patent is HB and 
0 if the patent is RE. The model controls for characteristics of the patent such as technology 
class, year of application, and others. It is possible to notice that essential patents have an 
odds of 2.3 to 1 to be homebound. Model (a) therefore suggests that inventive activity re-
lated to essential patents tends to be relatively more homebound than that related to non-
essential patents. In other words, the essentiality of a patent is a significant predictor for the 
domestic location of inventors. This confirms my hypothesis.25  
 
TABLE 4:  Logistic Regression  
Dependent Variable: all inventors are lo-
cated in HQ country/state (HB patents)   Odds Ratio   
 Model: ( a ) ( b ) ( c ) 
An ETSI Essential patent 2.30*** 2.39*** 2.66*** 
The patent assignee is Qualcomm   5.50*** 
The patent assignee is Motorola   1.37** 
The patent assignee is Nokia   3.98*** 
Essential patent x Qualcom  4.45*** 0.51 
Essential patent x Motorola  1.37*** 1.03 
Essential patent x Nokia  3.86*** 0.88 
Log likelihood  -1233.90 -1161.32 -930.55 
LR chi2  192.3 (28) 337.45 (31) 341.59 (34) 
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.127 0.128 
Observations 1,957    
Note: estimated with Stata 9.2 for Windows 
The reported odds ratio are marginal effect for discrete change of the dummy va-
riable in question from 0 to 1. 
Control variables are: years dummy, technology classes, number of claims.  
See the appendix for complete results. 
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**=5% significance   ***=1% significante    
 
In Model (c), I interact firm dummies with essentiality, to better interpret the firm-
specific homeboundedness of essential patenting. This model allows me to test the home-
boundedness hypotheses for each individual firm. 
TABLE 5:  Homeboundess at the individual firm level. 
Test of Hypotheses: Is the odds ratio to be HB significantly higher than one for essential 
patents? 
 
  Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Model ( a )       
Entire Group 2.30*** 0.27 7.01 0.00 1.83 2.91 
Model ( c )       
Patent assigned to:       
Ericsson 2.66*** 0.44 5.9 0.00 1.92 3.68 
Qualcomm 1.35 0.41 0.99 0.32 0.74 2.44 
Motorola 2.75*** 0.79 3.54 0.00 1.57 4.81 
Nokia 2.35** 0.88 2.3 0.022 1.13 4.88 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the test of hypotheses, when domesticality is defined at 
the state level for American companies and at the country level for Nokia and Ericsson.26  All 
but Qualcomm’s odds ratios appear to be significantly higher than one, implying that for 
Ericcson, Motorola and Nokia homeboundedness is more likely in the essential patent 
group. In the Qualcomm case, the data does not allow me to conclude that inventors’ loca-
tion related to essential patents is more homebound, but this is consistent with the fact that 
Qualcomm up to 2001 had little R&D activity outside California.27  
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4.  QUALITATIVE INSIGHTS:  COMPANY POINTS OF VIEW  
4.1.  Validation of the patent indicator 
An objective of the interviews was to test the validity of the methodology used in the pa-
tent analysis, and in particular the strength of the distinction between essential and non-
essential IP, and the use of patents as a proxy of R&D results. The interviews confirmed both 
the validity of the empirical approach and the limitations of the inventive location analysis.  
In general, managers confirmed that the inventors’ addresses on the USPTO documents are, 
in fact, good proxies for the countries where the R&D investments leading to those specific 
inventions were performed.  This is direct support of the methodological discussion of Ber-
gek and Berggren (2004), as well as the approach of Patel and Pavitt (1991), that has been 
partly replicated throughout this work.  
In addition to the common observations above, which have also been discussed in 
the literature, the managers stated that confidence in the accuracy of the inventors’ ad-
dresses is necessary in particular for USPTO patents, given that the U.S. system grants pro-
tection to “the first to invent” and not “the first to file”. In litigation, it is often the case that 
assignees have to trace back laboratory reports to show the original work of inventors.  A 
mismatch between the declared and actual location of invention can be lethal for the validity 
of a patent.  
Nonetheless, as previously acknowledged, the lag between the time of development 
of inventions underlying these patents and the current events shaping R&D investment of 
these firms significantly limits the breadth of this study. Managers emphasized the impor-
tance of recent strategic changes that cannot yet be recorded in the analysis of the location of 
inventive activity. There was general consensus that in a few years the situation might be 
significantly different, with a lot more inventive activity taking place in peripheral and for-
eign locations. This was acknowledged as a general trend in the industry, even if the inter-
viewees suggested that the homebound nature of strategic R&D of the type that we identify 
in this paper might not disappear.   
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To sum up, discussion regarding the methodology adopted for this study suggested 
that the inventive location analysis indeed portrays in a simple yet effective way the global 
distribution of R&D locations and the homebound nature of inventive activities related to 
essential IP.  However, managers warned researchers not to draw too many conclusions 
about the current technology sourcing strategies at their companies.   
4.2.  Explanations for the homebound nature of strategic R&D 
It was also important through the interviews to discuss the various drivers of R&D in-
ternationalization and to understand the R&D location history and the global distribution of labor 
within corporate R&D labs. Furthermore, I also asked managers to comment on the inventive 
location analysis. Finally, I discussed the various drivers of R&D internationalization and “non 
globalization”.  Managers were asked to explain different drivers of R&D internationalization 
and the relative concentration of IP assets related to the ETSI standards. 
All the managers interviewed had been with their companies for a significant num-
ber of years.  They were therefore in a position to discuss the latest developments, as well as 
provide a perspective on the past geographical distribution of the company’s activities, the 
main motives behind certain investment decisions, and the evolution of foreign R&D labs 
for both “transatlantic” and decentralization in developing countries. 
By and large the interviews did not highlight the cost explanation for the internatio-
nalization of R&D. Nonetheless they did confirm the importance of market demand, and the 
home-based exploitation and augmentation dimensions commonly discussed in the litera-
ture. Of particular interest here, however, are the reactions of the interviewed managers to 
the evidence for non-globalization that we find in our patent analysis. In this context they 
pointed to organizational inertia, rooted in the historical organization of the R&D laborato-
ries of their companies that counterbalance the internationalization of R&D. They also refer 
to the maturation and learning curve dimensions related to foreign R&D subsidiaries. Fur-
ther, in-house R&D is still considered important for upstream activities of a more strategic 
nature.  
Interviews confirmed the relevance of organizational inertia. This phenomenon was 
very much relevant to explain the stickiness of core R&D projects to traditional hubs. The 
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development of the radio technologies, based on which these ETSI wireless telecommunica-
tions standards originated, have been at the core of Ericsson and Motorola’s activities. These 
two companies acquired and developed these technologies well before the internationaliza-
tion of R&D became important, and the related knowledge appears to have accumulated lo-
cally in their home countries with a strong element of stickiness and tacitness. Based on pre-
vious research we also know that Nokia accumulated knowledge especially for the GSM 
standard at specific local sites in Finland, for example in the cities of Salo and Oulu (Palm-
berg and Martikainen, 2005).  Qualcomm developed most of its expertise in California, and 
acquisitions in other areas (mostly in the U.S.) were targeted to expand the technological 
know-how into new fields.  
The case of Motorola is particularly illuminating in this context. The interviewed 
managers at both companies were not surprised by the homebound nature of their notified 
essential patents. One of the managers at Motorola suggested that “We have started to develop 
these technologies in Illinois and it would not make sense to source them elsewhere”.  The organiza-
tional inertia that we discussed above can therefore also be translated into a cumulative ad-
vantage for the homebound location of R&D as long as knowledge developed there is rele-
vant for the present technological trajectory of the industry. The greatest threat to home-
bound R&D of the more strategic type apparently relates to technological discontinuities ex-
ternal to the company.  “As long as radio technologies will be used in a mobile phone, we cannot see 
how we can divest from our traditional R&D centers [in Illinois]”. The interviewees of all com-
panies were convinced about this point, as well as with the assertion that it should not be 
taken for granted that `the next big technology’ will come from the domestic R&D center.    
These observations about organizational inertia and accumulated local knowledge 
are consistent with the vast literature on centers of excellence (see Frost et al. (2002), Birkin-
shaw et al. (2002)).  This literature claims that foreign R&D subsidiaries will develop exper-
tise collateral to the core competence of the firm. However, this will not lead to an interna-
tionalization of R&D projects directly related to core technologies and strategic R&D.  (see 
references discussed in section 2.2).  
The interviewees also concurred on the maturation dimension of foreign R&D invest-
ment as an explanation for the homebound nature of strategic R&D. In particular, foreign 
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R&D subsidiaries have a long learning curve. They can only progressively gain visibility on 
the overall corporate R&D organization and hence earn their autonomy for more strategic 
types of R&D. Foreign R&D subsidiaries might initially have been set up for home-base ex-
ploitation purposes but may subsequently mature into knowledge augmenting centers. 
While modularity in R&D projects connected to wireless technology allows for a fine-tuned 
division of labor and collaboration across different teams, the investment required to give a 
research team the tools necessary for their work is still considerable.  Motorola managers 
talked about “critical mass” that has to be in place at foreign R&D subsidiaries for them to 
become truly operative also in terms of home-based augmentation.   
The two Nordic companies added that one has to become `committed´ to a foreign 
location before getting anything useful out of it. Becoming committed does not only have to 
do with the physical investment necessary to get a foreign R&D subsidiary up and running; 
it also has to do with the accumulation and maturation of `soft´ and more intangible ele-
ments. Once a foreign R&D subsidiary gains sufficient credibility in the company organiza-
tion it becomes a critical asset, and it is unlikely that successful subsidiaries will be divested.  
Until this occurs homebound R&D will thus play a predominant role for strategic projects. 
 
4.3.  Safe Nests: Centralized IP management practices as a selection bias for 
R&D appropriability? 
So far I have considered whether and why the undertaking of more strategic R&D is 
homebound. In this final section I consider whether patents, which result from R&D per-
formed at home, have a greater chance to become notified at ETSI. Since I am using patents 
as indicators for the organization of R&D, it could be the case that patents resulting from 
homebound R&D activities are also easier “to appropriate” and thus, in this particular con-
text, have a higher probability of turning into notified essential patents in the ETSI system. 
To what degree does such a possible “selection bias” affect, as well as complement, our dis-
cussion in the previous section?  
I define appropriability as the ability of companies to take exclusive possession and 
extract value from the application of technologies and other intangible assets (for a similar 
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definition see Teece (1986) and Gans and Stern (2002)). This ability is embedded in the IP 
management activities of companies, on the peculiar linkages that they seek to create be-
tween exploration (R&D) activities and its commercial exploitation. It is thereby influenced 
by headquarters’ guidelines and by the level of sophistication of an IP culture. The disclo-
sure of inventions within the company and the filing at patent offices around the world are 
typically done on a decentralized basis depending on where the inventors are located. How-
ever, once patents have been filed at the patent offices, the actual strategic management of 
these IP assets is centralized within the company. In the context of this paper, this manage-
ment concerns issues such as the notification of patents to ETSI, licensing strategies and 
possible litigation, as well as the ex-ante definition of patenting objectives at the corporate 
level.  
The interviews confirmed that while IP procurement is decentralized, management 
and exploitation of IP assets rests within the competences of the headquarter offices. That is, 
inventors dispersed globally need sufficient interaction to IP managers and attorneys when 
filing for patents. Managers explained that inventors can get local access to decentralized pa-
tenting committees in the phase of invention disclosure, and that foreign R&D subsidiaries 
have to fulfill their own patenting objectives. However, managers at the four companies ac-
knowledged that subsequent phases of IP management, such as portfolio management and 
exploitation of IP assets remain centralized as well as homebound. Headquarters were par-
ticularly very much involved in the selection of patents to be deemed essential for standar-
dization.  
Each of the interviewed managers agreed that not all patents are well-written and 
useful documents. It is quite well known that many patents are practically useless or unen-
forceable, as they read on claims and technologies which have already been patented, or that 
have no practical use. One could thus argue that R&D projects that are more closely moni-
tored by IP experts in the home countries will also produce patents that are better written 
and easier to appropriate further downstream in the context of notification, licensing, and 
possible litigation. While the interviewee at Ericsson confirmed this idea, the interviewee at 
Nokia could only acknowledge a possible “IP-bias”, but he could not verify this hypothesis 
as he had not been directly involved in IP management. The interviewees at Motorola and 
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Qualcomm denied the relevance of centralized IP management as a source of selection bias 
to explain my evidence on the case for non-globalization. 
 In the case of Ericsson, disclosure and patent filing take place at the site of invention. 
IP management is then centralized at the headquarters in Stockholm, and licensing and 
possible litigation are also handled at this location. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that R&D teams around the world are doing less strategic R&D. What this does mean is that 
results of R&D projects that take place abroad are more difficult to be noticed, understood in 
a timely fashion, and ultimately appropriated. This is best exemplified with a citation: “by 
the time I know that my research team in Australia is working on a project that might have some im-
plications for one of our standards, it is going to be too late to act on that”. While the interviewee at 
Nokia could not comment on the relevance of IP management centralization, it was sug-
gested that for standardization a close co-operation is necessary between R&D and the 
teams following standardization, as much support is needed in order to define technically 
the best solution.  
Among the four companies, Ericsson has the most internationalized R&D activities 
and has the most remarkable difference in the foreign share between essential and control 
group patents.  Views expressed in the course of the discussion at Ericsson did not deny the 
importance of path dependency in explaining why critical R&D projects are still located in 
Sweden.  Also, great attention to IP related issues is given to research labs around the world, 
both in Europe and in other countries.  Still, the need for some R&D projects to be closely 
tied to centralized IP management at the headquarters was singled out as the prevailing fac-
tor in guiding decisions to keep some of the most sensitive projects homebound.   
It seems therefore that the cases of Ericsson and Nokia suggest that there is a certain 
degree of selection bias in my empirical analysis in so far as centralized homebound IP man-
agement provides preferential treatment of inventions with equally home-based inventors. 
However, this does not appear to be the case for Qualcomm and Motorola. According to the 
interviews this was due to a mature and global IP management system in the case of Moto-
rola, and a concentration of most of the R&D activities around San Diego, in the case of 
Qualcomm. These two companies however conceded that close local coordination between 
R&D and IP people is a key ingredient for the exploitation of new technologies. 
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In light of such discussion I can assert that: 
1. My quantitative analysis suggests that for three of these four companies some IP 
assets are more or less visible to the HQ depending on the location of R&D activi-
ty. In other words, the level of appropriability of IP assets is not uniform across 
the R&D network;  
2. According to the views expressed by managers at Nokia and Ericsson appropria-
bility peaks where the level of coordination between R&D and IP manager is 
higher, in what I here call “Safe R&D Nests”.  
This paper can only suggest that the discussion and empirical analysis of internatio-
nalization of R&D should take more care in considering also how IP management practices 
of companies affect their global dispersion of R&D. In particular, the “Safe Nests research 
hypothesis” would claim that home-base augmentation strategies abroad require a clearer 
decentralization of IP management activities in order to also secure appropriation of foreign 




5.  CONCLUSIONS:  SAFE NESTS IN GLOBAL NETS 
This paper suggests that the dynamics of R&D “non-globalization” brought forward 
some twenty years ago by Patel and Pavitt (1991) were still recognizable during a critical 
phase of the recent technological development of one of the most high-tech and internatio-
nalized industries. Moreover my quantitative analysis implies that the more strategic R&D 
and inventive activity relating to the technological core of the wireless industry is still very 
homebound. The observation is based on an analysis of essential patents of four significant 
companies (Motorola, Qualcomm, Ericsson and Nokia) in the industry set against a bench-
mark of non-notified control group patents.  My paper brings a new contribution to the lite-
rature supporting quantitative empirical findings with a fresh interpretation. 
The empirical set-up seeks to control for possible country and firm biases.  Nonethe-
less, it hinges on the assumption that notified essential patents are strategically, and proba-
bly also technologically and economically, more significant than their non-notified counter-
parts in the control group. Moreover, observation only concerns the R&D and inventive ac-
tivity of these firms in relation to standards commissioned by ETSI. While these are impor-
tant standards in the development of the industry towards next generation wireless tele-
communications technologies, these firms also hold patents of great importance to a range of 
other standards outside ETSI that have not been considered here. More research is needed to 
generalize findings beyond the setting here discussed.28 
 
Despite these evident limitations, this paper presents important questions related to 
the organization of R&D and inventive activity in this industry worthy of exploration in 
subsequent research. In particular, the interviews I undertook with R&D and IP managers of 
all of the included firms provide complementary and novel insights on the homebound na-
ture of strategic R&D and inventive activity in this industry. The picture presented varies for 
each of the four companies, and a different mix of organizational inertia, maturation, and 
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learning curve effects, as well as IP management issue, come into play and appear to counter 
the drivers for R&D internationalization    
Organizational inertia, maturation, and learning curve effects are well known limita-
tions of home-augmenting R&D internationalization strategies. Indeed, the increased em-
phasis on knowledge creation (alleged or real) in the peripheral regions of the world led the 
theory to focus on various organizational modes for this phenomenon, but none of these dis-
cussions points to the international distribution of different phases of IP management.  Some 
directions for further research might be found in Teece (2006) who suggests that not only the 
sources, but also the appropriability of unique sources of knowledge is the main foundation 
of what he calls the “special advantage” of MNCs. My hypothesis on the Safe-Nests is con-
sistent with this view and claims that the level of appropriability is not equally distributed 
across the corporate R&D network. Some subsidiary centers have been more successful than 
others in developing the necessary expertise to exploit new technologies. One of the factors 
contributing to such expertise is the coordination between R&D and IP management.  
This study was not set up to test the relevance of IP management coordination in for-
eign R&D labs. The Safe Nests argument originates to explain a potential bias in my data 
collection (since I consider patents as a proxy of R&D investment and inventive activities). 
Also, this study considers company-specific behavior during a critical juncture of the tech-
nological development of the wireless telecom industry. It is therefore quite difficult on such 
grounds to generalize the relevance of the Safe-Nests hypothesis, as an alternative explana-
tion in the context of an over-reaching understanding of the homebound nature of strategic 
R&D and inventive activities. More case studies are needed, drawn from various other in-
dustries where a comparative methodology can be used, and evidence on the R&D and IP 
organization of multinationals can be gathered so that Safe-Nests can be identified and iso-
lated. 
Do inventive activities developed far from IP monitoring have a lesser chance to be-
come visible for commercialization? Does coordination between foreign R&D teams and 
strategic IP management lead to higher appropriability of local R&D investment? If con-
firmed such claims could greatly contribute in understanding Teece’s special advantage and 
ultimately explain cases where Patel and Pavitt’s non-globalization argument still holds. 
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Implications for MNCs could be significant, since managers seeking to extract value from 
their Unsafe foreign R&D Nests might have to consider greater decentralization of IP plan-
ning and management functions.  
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APPENDIX 1 :  Logistic regression results 
MODEL ( a ) 
Logistic regression                                Number of obs   =       1957 
                                                   LR chi2(28)     =     192.30 
                                                   Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1233.8938                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0723 
 
 
Dependent Variable: All inventors are 
located in HQ contry/state (HB patents) Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z         [ 95% Conf. Interval] 
An ETSI Essential patent 2.30464 0.2743359 7.01 0.000     1.825069 2.910228 
yr1986 0.7476471 0.5781428 -0.38 0.707     .1642393 3.403426 
yr1987 0.5846291 0.3710682 -0.85 0.398     .1685066 2.028355 
yr1988 1.294791 0.8396458 0.4 0.690     .3632561 4.615159 
yr1989 0.9665821 0.5276218 -0.06 0.950     .3315882 2.817594 
yr1990 1.82404 0.9982056 1.1 0.272     .6240426 5.33156 
yr1991 0.9875457 0.5306703 -0.02 0.981     .3444714 2.831139 
yr1992 1.390088 0.7262578 0.63 0.528     .4992613 3.870405 
yr1993 1.365777 0.7000431 0.61 0.543     .5001353 3.729683 
yr1994 0.8974868 0.4488632 -0.22 0.829     .3367548 2.391897 
yr1995 0.8028444 0.3956738 -0.45 0.656     .3055803 2.109296 
yr1996 0.6807864 0.332236 -0.79 0.431     .2615829 1.771791 
yr1997 0.8948468 0.4357815 -0.23 0.820      .344526 2.32421 
yr1998 0.5688124 0.2792277 -1.15 0.250      .217329 1.488745 
yr1999 0.8831202 0.440183 -0.25 0.803     .3324653 2.345812 
yr2000 0.7014385 0.3659539 -0.68 0.497     .2522908 1.950194 
yr2001 1.452056 0.8784527 0.62 0.538     .4436401 4.752653 
USpatCl340 0.0266976 0.0203476 -4.75 0.000     .0059941 0.11891 
USpatCl342 1.56718 0.5437546 1.29 0.195     .7939312 3.093535 
USpatCl370 1.086676 0.2227635 0.41 0.685     .7271224 1.624024 
USpatCl375 0.8982871 0.2085684 -0.46 0.644     .5698745 1.41596 
USpatCl379 1.266612 0.3307502 0.91 0.365     .7592229 2.113088 
USpatCl455 0.783765 0.1574874 -1.21 0.225     .5286254 1.162047 
USpatCl704 2.081366 0.7931789 1.92 0.054     .9862059 4.392676 
clNum10to19 0.6199883 0.0876759 -3.38 0.001     .4699054 0.818006 
clNum20to29 0.5242658 0.0792531 -4.27 0.000     .3898304 0.705062 
clNum30to39 0.6414054 0.124655 -2.29 0.022     .4382323 0.938774 
clNum40plus 0.5751231 0.1181198 -2.69 0.007     .3845383 0.860166 
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MODEL ( b ) 
Logistic regression   Number of obs 1957 
   LR chi2(31) 337.45 
   Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1161.3201  Pseudo R2 0.1269 
 
Dependent Variable: All inventors are located 
in HQ contry/state (HB patents) Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
An ETSI Essential patent 2.386207 0.2974136 6.98 0 1.869027 3.046497 
The patent assignee is Qualcomm 4.45043 0.7434208 8.94 0 3.207844 6.174342 
The patent assignee is Motorola 1.369632 0.1858416 2.32 0.02 1.0498 1.786903 
The patent assignee is Nokia 3.857061 0.5864656 8.88 0 2.863066 5.196149 
yr1986 0.6539313 0.5111059 -0.54 0.587 0.141332 3.025676 
yr1987 0.549851 0.3504835 -0.94 0.348 0.157644 1.917847 
yr1988 1.282272 0.8309114 0.38 0.701 0.360083 4.566234 
yr1989 0.824982 0.4542387 -0.35 0.727 0.280394 2.427279 
yr1990 1.736609 0.9515841 1.01 0.314 0.59331 5.083027 
yr1991 0.8433733 0.4574967 -0.31 0.754 0.291257 2.442098 
yr1992 1.033229 0.5440275 0.06 0.95 0.36814 2.899886 
yr1993 0.9808366 0.5069688 -0.04 0.97 0.35615 2.701224 
yr1994 0.5479713 0.2777701 -1.19 0.235 0.202898 1.479917 
yr1995 0.5000612 0.2501424 -1.39 0.166 0.1876 1.332951 
yr1996 0.4896013 0.2421519 -1.44 0.149 0.185715 1.290739 
yr1997 0.6732525 0.3321683 -0.8 0.423 0.255984 1.77069 
yr1998 0.4541759 0.2254513 -1.59 0.112 0.171669 1.201593 
yr1999 0.6425121 0.3250432 -0.87 0.382 0.238376 1.731806 
yr2000 0.4713429 0.2499497 -1.42 0.156 0.166706 1.332671 
yr2001 0.5897727 0.3671422 -0.85 0.396 0.1741 1.997883 
USpatCl340 0.0314806 0.0241825 -4.5 0 0.006985 0.141877 
USpatCl342 1.255775 0.465369 0.61 0.539 0.607395 2.596288 
USpatCl370 1.249952 0.2676106 1.04 0.297 0.821588 1.90166 
USpatCl375 0.9287471 0.2246247 -0.31 0.76 0.578133 1.491994 
USpatCl379 1.568597 0.4287255 1.65 0.1 0.918043 2.680155 
USpatCl455 0.9717792 0.2050715 -0.14 0.892 0.642601 1.469583 
USpatCl704 2.504375 0.9910212 2.32 0.02 1.153095 5.439179 
clNum10to19 0.6187577 0.0910229 -3.26 0.001 0.463771 0.825539 
clNum20to29 0.5859728 0.092048 -3.4 0.001 0.430691 0.79724 
clNum30to39 0.7624215 0.1548459 -1.34 0.182 0.512057 1.135199 
clNum40plus 0.6895595 0.1481609 -1.73 0.084 0.452564 1.050663 
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MODEL ( c ) 
Logistic regression                     Number of obs   =       1957 
                                                       LR chi2(34)     =     341.59 
                                                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1159.2484      Pseudo R2       =     0.1284 
 
Dependent Variable: All inventors are 
located in HQ contry/state (HB pa-
tents) Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
An ETSI Essential patent 2.661071 0.4410911 5.9 0 1.922932 3.682554 
The patent assignee is Qualcomm 5.50423 1.112867 8.44 0 3.703372 8.180802 
The patent assignee is Motorola 1.374822 0.2058311 2.13 0.033 1.025201 1.843673 
The patent assignee is Nokia 3.982422 0.6603356 8.33 0 2.877448 5.511721 
Essential patent x Qualcom 0.5067101 0.1737399 -1.98 0.047 0.258762 0.992243 
Essential patent x Motorola 1.03365 0.3397985 0.1 0.92 0.542691 1.968768 
Essential patent x Nokia 0.8840351 0.3589666 -0.3 0.761 0.398873 1.959313 
yr1986 0.6234613 0.4911288 -0.6 0.549 0.133131 2.91971 
yr1987 0.532915 0.3412921 -0.98 0.326 0.151889 1.869772 
yr1988 1.259381 0.8187981 0.35 0.723 0.35216 4.503743 
yr1989 0.8424786 0.4638997 -0.31 0.756 0.286323 2.478916 
yr1990 1.754276 0.9620091 1.02 0.305 0.598848 5.13901 
yr1991 0.8447601 0.4586622 -0.31 0.756 0.291457 2.44846 
yr1992 1.039875 0.548382 0.07 0.941 0.36991 2.923247 
yr1993 0.9969206 0.5155459 -0.01 0.995 0.361803 2.746943 
yr1994 0.5659421 0.2869786 -1.12 0.262 0.209481 1.528975 
yr1995 0.507904 0.2541398 -1.35 0.176 0.190487 1.354245 
yr1996 0.4799802 0.2375943 -1.48 0.138 0.181916 1.266413 
yr1997 0.6566643 0.3243674 -0.85 0.395 0.249392 1.729039 
yr1998 0.4413862 0.2194041 -1.65 0.1 0.166611 1.169321 
yr1999 0.62219 0.3153544 -0.94 0.349 0.230407 1.680161 
yr2000 0.4591005 0.2439017 -1.47 0.143 0.162069 1.30052 
yr2001 0.5440348 0.3403607 -0.97 0.331 0.159623 1.854206 
USpatCl340 0.0308721 0.0237694 -4.52 0 0.006827 0.139615 
USpatCl342 1.401568 0.5192552 0.91 0.362 0.678047 2.897135 
USpatCl370 1.247578 0.2674166 1.03 0.302 0.819622 1.898985 
USpatCl375 0.9310356 0.2252749 -0.3 0.768 0.57944 1.495975 
USpatCl379 1.599212 0.4367353 1.72 0.086 0.936371 2.731267 
USpatCl455 0.9738708 0.2056489 -0.13 0.9 0.643808 1.473149 
USpatCl704 2.490372 0.9885132 2.3 0.022 1.143914 5.421694 
clNum10to19 0.6166918 0.0910133 -3.28 0.001 0.461791 0.823552 
clNum20to29 0.5895552 0.0928459 -3.36 0.001 0.432985 0.802741 
clNum30to39 0.7761153 0.1579006 -1.25 0.213 0.520894 1.156387 





APPENDIX 2 :  Interviews conducted 
 
Date Name of the 
Interviewee 
Company Role in the company 
August, 08 Phil Gilchrist Motorola VP 3GSM Platform Reference 
Design Engineering Mobile 
Device Business 
September, 01 Miguel Pellon Motorola Vice President, Technology - 
Standards 
September, 16 Nhils Forslund Ericsson assistant to the VP for Stan-
dards and Corporate Manager 
for IP strategy 
September, 18 Timo Ali Vehmas Nokia VP Standards and industry re-
lations 
November, 30 Ed Tiedemann Qualcomm VP Standards 
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APPENDIX 3 :  Structure of the Interviews 
Conversations with managers were divided into two parts. During the first half of the inter-
view managers were presented with the results of the study. Subsequently, discussion was 
guided through a set of open questions.   
Questions were presented according to the following sequence: 
Open Question 1 
• How “essential” are the essential patents? 
– More significant technologies? 
– More strategic R&D? 
– Lying the closest to the changing technological core of the industry? 
• How “non essential” are the non essential patents?  
– Less significant technologies? 
– Quantity matters for strategy?  
(Large portfolio of non essential patents) 
– Back up technologies? Different technological paradigms? 
Open Question 2 
• Why are Essential Patents Homebound? 
– National Location Advantages? 
(absorptive capability, ties with local innovation system and knowledge cen-
ters) 
– Organizational Inertia/Path Dependency? 
Foreign R&D investment to serve foreign markets, different sources of specia-
lization 
– IP-Management and Control of Essential Assets 
Open Question 3 
• What can we say about the internationalization of R&D if we look at patents? 
– Not all R&D is patented/patentable 
– Different emphasis and incentives to patenting across the organization? (in 
the home country and abroad?) 
• Nokia’s distribution of R&D Labs? 
– (location, size, type of activities, relation to essential patenting, relation 
with local demand, ties with the local innovation system) 
Open Question 4 
• How and why does Nokia’s Model differ? 
– The data seems to suggest an interesting profile for Nokia (homebound & 
closed innovation for essential patents, and open and global for the wireless 
patents) 
• What about the other three firms? 
– Ericsson, very similar to Nokia 
– Motorola, closed!  Homebound for the essential, and Global for the non-
essential 
– Qualcomm, open but homebound 
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Open Question 5 
• Upstream Standard Setting Vs  
Downstream Technology Integration? 
– Is R&D internationalization and open innovation the main mode for tech-
nology integration? 
– When do R&D alliances enter the picture? 
• Essential patenting? 
• Standard setting? 
• Technology integration? 
• Commercialization?  
– What are the IP Management challenges? 
Open Question 6 
• What’s Next? 
– The rise of China and India? 
– The demise of the Nordic countries?  
• Advanced Users? 
• Killer applications (IP Telephony,…)? 
• The role of Sweden as a location for R&D? 
– Next Generation Standards? 
• Within 3G competition (TD-SCDMA, WCDMA, CDMA2000)? 
• Beyond 3G/4G? 





1 The already cited UNCTAD (2005) report offers a comprehensive overview of international trade and investment. 
2 A classic starting point here is Baldwin and Clark (2000) Brusoni et al. (2001) apply the concepts of modularization to the or-
ganization and extension of R&D projects. 
3 Even though the empirical analysis presented in the next sections does not directly address the cost advantage explanation for 
the internationalization of R&D, it is important to acknowledge its relevance. Organizational challenges, related to the offshor-
ing of the most labor-intensive phases of R&D to low-cost countries are not easy to overcome.  Expertise of dispersed teams, as 
well as the architectural complexities of each single product or component, will ultimately determine whether or not a project 
requires geographical proximity For a detailed study of product development and modularization of tasks across dispersed re-
search teams in semiconductors, see Schofield and Gregory (2004). Global players might decide to relocate the most labor-
intensive phases of their R&D effort to regions that are desirable, not for the size or growth rate of their market, nor for other 
cutting edge R&D activities located in the area, but simply because of the availability of qualified and cheap technical expertise.  
The development of ICT infrastructures is now making available qualified and cheap human capital located in rapidly develop-
ing countries (most notably India, South East Asia, China) and transitional economies (Eastern Europe).  This has, in turn, al-
ready led to the delocalization of low-end support service functions.  It is quite likely that firms that have already gone through 
a delocalization of back-office operations will now look at the same areas as possible locations to move some parts of their R&D 
operations. Being the first to open up a subsidiary in a foreign country is a risky venture; closures and downsizing of FDIs are a 
very common phenomenon.  When a company gains understanding of the local institutions and business climate it is likely to 
consider “upgrading” its investment in that territory before plunging into a grassroots investment in a new region (examples of 
upgrading have been studied in particular in the software industry: see O’Riain, 1997 for a study of Ireland; Dossani and 
Kenney, 2003 for back office operations in India).  
4 For a more complete review of the literature on the organizational dimension of foreign R&D activities, see Werner (2002) and 
Zanfei and Solvell (2000).   
5 Numerous studies challenge the argument that ”maturation” is working only one way, and that R&D centers originally adapt-
ing R&D to foreign markets then become centers of excellence and learning centers of new technologies. According to many 
studies, demand adaptation remains the main driver for FDI in R&D. See here Dunning and Narula (1995); Anand and Kogut 
(1997); Hakanson and Nobel (1993); Hagedoorn and Narula (1996); Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001); Athreye 
and Keeble (2000); Gertler et al. (2000); Yeung (1999); Zanfei (2000); Le Bas and Sierra (2002); von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 
2002). 
6 IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management (1996), Vol.43, 1. 
7 A series of OECD reports (see for example: OECD, 1993) started to infer the policy implication of a global interconnection of 
technology development activities and the need of countries to create the necessary conditions to attract this form of invest-
ment. 
8 See here among others: Patel (1996), Duysters (1996), Kleinknecht and ter Wengel (1998), Patel and Vega (1999), Meyer-
Krahmer and Reger (1999), Rama (1999), Asakawa (2001), Belderbos (2001), Kumar, 2001, Mowery (2001), Edler et al. (2002), 
Mendez, 2002, Bergek and Berggren (2004), Macher et al. (2007).  
9 See here: Pearce and Singh (1992), Cantwell (1992 and 1995), Schott (1994), Dunning (1995), Shan and Song (1997), Guellec and 
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001), Le Bas and Sierra (2002), and Cesaroni et al. (2004). For a recent review of R&D global-
ization in various industries see Macher and Mowery (2008). 
10 The alternative here is to ”act  strategically”, timing the disclosure of essential IP in order to create ”lock-in” situations for the 
partners. Both partners of the standardization committee and third parties, which hold supposedly essential IPRs, might fail or 
voluntarily conceal the potential infringement by the standards of technologies that they have already patented or that they are 
currently developing and are going to be covered by patents. This type of behaviour attempts to maximize future licensing 
revenue but threatens the future success of the standard. For a variety of reasons not discussed here (See Bekkers 2002), in the 
case of ETSI wireless standards, late disclosure or concealment of potentially essential patent did not constitute a problem for 
the commercial application of standards and we think that it should not constitute a troublesome bias for the empirical analysis 
discussed in section 3. 
11 Results discussed in the empirical section are confirmed using various control group sampling and selection of non-notified 
patents on the basis of technological similarity to essential patents. Given the diversified activities of some of the companies 
represented in this study I choose to compare here results using the most restrictive sampling, obtained according to the ap-
proach here described. The goal of such sampling is to select non-notified patents that protect technology which is similar to 
that of essential patents. In other words, when considering exclusevely the characteristics of the technologies protected, essen-




12 In order to gather the most complete set of patents filed by the company and its controlled subsidiaries, original search 
strings are used combining the parent company with its fully owned subsidiaries (data gathered through Mergent Online and 
Who Owns Whom).  Possible variations of names for the same companies were also considered.  Patent data was gathered 
through Thomson’s Dialog search service.  Dialog constantly checks patents for misspellings and incorrect information. 
13 Keyword extraction was performed using the Vantage Point software developed by Search Technology Inc.  
14Out of the 4,358 non-notified patents belonging to at least one of the technology classes of essential patents, 3.501 patent fami-
lies do either (a) cite at least one patent cited by at least one essential patent, or (b) include in their abstract at least one of the 
technological keywords extracted in at least one essential patent. Out of this subset, through propensity score matching I select 
a control group of 1,420 identifying the closest neighbourghs to essential patents on the basis of technological keywords used 
and backward citations. Propensity score matching was performed using the psmatch2 module in STATA described in Leuven 
and Sianesi (2003) 
 
15 No information has been gathered about the current use of these patents, and it is not possible to convincingly predict their 
future use.  Even if I assume that these patents will not be deemed essential for ETSI standards, some of them might indeed 
protect critical aspects of a commercialized product, be relevant for other standards, or become the objects of profitable licens-
ing contracts. As note 18 explains, the assumption of  less strategic relevance of control group patents is confirmed with for-
ward patent citation analysis.  
16 The Delphion Patent Family database is used for this procedure. For the sake of clarity, throughout the rest of the paper the 
two sets of patents are  referred to as the “essential patents” and the “control group patents,” stressing again that all the ensu-
ing tables and figures contain data collected at the level of patent families and that “non internationally protected” patents as-
signed to U.S. companies are excluded. 
17 All USPTO essential patents assigned to U.S. companies have at least one European equivalent in the patent family.  This 
means, de facto, that the “international protection” correction just discussed applies exclusively to the control group.  This is not 
surprising, given the commercial relevance of these patents on the European market.   
18 I also consider forward patent citations to weight the importance of single patents. Forward patent citations, defined as the 
number of patents citing a specific patent, are used as a proxy for the usefulness and technological significance of each individ-
ual patent.  For each patent, all non-self forward patent citations received in the two years after each patent was granted are 
considered. The discussion of a different strategic value of essential and control group patents finds some evidence in the pat-
ent citation analysis.  Essential patents have a statistically significant higher average forward citation rate (4.2 citations per pat-
ent) than that of the  control group  (2.82 citation for patents).  Essential patents, by definition, are patents whose commercial 
application and usefulness have been somehow certified through their notification.  They are therefore more likely to get cited 
as relevant prior art by subsequent and related patents, than patents in the same technological classes that are not identified as 
essential ones.  The citation rate of patents by Qualcomm is the highest and stands out. Qualcomm essential patents received on 
average 6.21 citations, and its non essential patents 4.1.  This holds for both essential and control group patents, even when con-
trolling for the age of patents.  Qualitative investigation with industry experts suggests that Qualcomm is developing technolo-
gies of a more generic (or enabling) nature and, as a result, it plays the double role of competitor and technology provider (in 
particular for the CDMA and 3rd generation networks).  Generic technologies are likely to receive more citations than more ap-
plication-specific patents, since their range of application is much broader. 
19 See Appendix for a complete list of the interviews conducted and questions made.  Interviews were not recorded, but notes 
from the interviews were sent back to the interviewees for comments and amendments.  Interviews lasted between one and 
two hours, one was conducted over the phone and the others in person. It was possible to get interviews with top managers at 
these companies thanks to the mediation of faculty and researchers taking part to a joint project at the University of California, 
Berkeley and ETLA the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. 
20 This analysis considers data at the country level for the two European companies and at the state level for the two U.S. corpo-
rations. I chose this approach to clearly identify the location of the main R&D hub, for each of these four companies. Motorola 
and Qualcomm display a significant concentration of their R&D activities around the Chicago and San Diego area respectively; 
in the proximities to their global headquarters. As for the European companies, in spite of the presence of various regional labs 
scattered in Finland and Sweden, much of the homebound R&D is performed in the main labs outside Helsinki (Nokia) and 
Stockholm (Ericsson). Other reasons, such as linguistic and cultural similarities, mobility of the labor market, enforcement of 
the IPR system might have suggested a different level of analysis, especially for the U.S. companies. In the remaining of the pa-
per I will therefore consider how results vary when considering U.S. country level data. 
21 This is not surprising given that on average essential patents tend to receive more citations than control group patents. Out of 
the total portfolio of 2 years forward citations to essential patents, 75.27% cite an HB patent, whereas out of the same portfolio 
of citations which cite control group patents, 57.05% cite HB patents. For both patent count and citations, the Pearson Chi-
Square values confirm that it is possible to reject (with 0.01% significance level) the null hypotheses that the homeboundness of 
inventive activity locations is similar for essential and control group patents. This holds true both when I use county-level, and 
state-level specifications of homeboundness. 
o
22 In the course of the interviews at Motorola (discussed in the next section), managers focused on the relevance and concentra-




was told, Motorola developed such competence in its main R&D laboratories. While significant investments took place around 
the U.S. and in other foreign countries, it was still a natural transition, for the main working group specializing on radio tech-
nologies, to take the lead on the development of GSM and other ETSI standards.   
23 Qualcomm’s share of essential HB patents (83.4%) is higher than in the control group (75.5%), however the small number of 
observation of RE patents does not allow me to suggest that such difference is statistically significant. 
24 The sharp decline in the last two years might have been biased by a database tailing effect.  Patents are grouped by applica-
tion date, and for some of the latest years patents might have been still under review at the USPTO by the time the empirical 
analysis was conducted.  In spite of this bias, it is well known that after the euphoria of the late 1990s and the strong emphasis 
on patenting, some rationalization of R&D budgets took place in the industry, and this is likely to have impacted domestic and 
foreign R&D activities differently. 
25 Results for Model (a) hold also when I use county-level specification of homeboundness for the two U.S. companies. 
26 At the country level the coefficients for the two American companies in the samples appear not to be significant. 
27 As I have already discussed, nearly all of Qualcomm’s R&D was homebound and thus the non-significance of the coefficient 
is driven by the lack of the comparison group. 
28 I would also like to acknowledge here a comment made by an anonymous reviewer, who suggested that an interesting alter-
native unit of observation could have been inventors or inventive teams rather than individual patents. In this study two indi-
vidual patents authored by the same inventor count as two distinct observations. Considering the homeboundness of inventive 
teams rather than invention, and in particular the location of the most prolific inventive teams could be an interesting research 
question for subsequent works. 
